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DOES THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 RISE
TO THE LEVEL OF A TAKING?
HOW THE COURT MISSED THE BOAT IN
MARITRANS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
Mary A. Denison*
"The more often the government must pay for exercising control
over private property, the less control there will be. That is the
reality... ownership of property carries responsibilities to the
community as a whole as well as privileges."'
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent case in the Court of Federal Claims was the first test by
owners of oil tankers and tank barges of section 41152 of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (OPA 90), otherwise known as the vessel construction require-
ment.3 The Court held that Maritrans, Inc., owners of thirty-seven tank
barges affected by the Act's double hull requirement, was premature in
claiming that the requirement exacted a regulatory taking of their property.4
The court used a standard of review that deviated in part from U.S. Supreme
Court takings guidelines and instead followed a more conservative script
dictated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal District.5 This Note
will first provide a historical foundation by analyzing the background,
statutory content, and intended effect of OPA 90, as well as a short sum-
mary of the evolution of takings decisions in both the Supreme Court and
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2001.
1. FloridaRockIndus.v.United States, 18F.3d 1560,1575,1580 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Nies,
J. dissenting).
2. See Pub. L. No. 101-380 § 4115, 104 Stat. 484 (1990); see also 46 U.S.C. §
3703a(a)-(c) (1994) (statutory authority for the Secretary of Transportation to "prescribe
regulations for the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation,
equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of vessels...").
3. See Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 86, 87 (1999).
4. See id. at 92.
5. See generally M. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian Property,
Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 17 1,
195-98 (1995).
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the Federal Circuit courts. Following that discussion will be a consideration
of the Maritrans opinion itself. This Note concludes with a discussion of
the peculiar tailoring of the court's analysis and the effect this opinion may
have on both vessel owners and triers of fact in future considerations of
OPA 90. This Note will also examine an alternative test of regulatory
takings that may have provided guidance for the Maritrans court in
reaching its conclusion that OPA 90 did not exact a taking of vessels out of
compliance with the Act's construction requirement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
An attempt at federal legislation of oil spill pollution first appeared in
1972 as part of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).6 The
FWPCA contained sections dealing with liability, contingency planning,
regulation of facilities, and a small revolving cleanup fund.7 After the
passage of the FWPCA, additional provisional packages were pieced onto
different legislative acts, such as the compensation program of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) and the Fishermen's Contingency
Fund,9 but the resulting patchwork of laws caused confusion and was often
conflicting on matters of liability.10 Although several attempts were made
in the following years to resolve the conflict and create a comprehensive oil
pollution program, all efforts eventually failed due to a lack of agreement
between the Senate and the House of Representatives on proposed legisla-
tion. In March of 1989, the urgent need for such legislation suddenly
became abundantly clear.
On March 24, 1989, the tanker M/V Exxon Valdez struck a reef in
Prince William Sound spilling approximately 11 million gallons of oil and
causing one of the worst marine ecological disasters in history." In August
of 1990, after eighteen months of intense pressure from both the public and
the media, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act (OPA 90),12 thereby
introducing the most sweeping changes to marine pollution law since the
FWPCA. The intent of OPA 90 was consolidation of the many fragmented
federal and state laws and the enactment of a new bill that would
6. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
7. See id.
8. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1994). OCSLA regulations govern the oil and gas
leasing operations on the outer continental shelf of the United States. See id. § 1344.
9. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1842 (1994).
10. See generally, Note, Oils Spills and Cleanup Bills: Federal Recovery of Oil Spill
Cleanup Costs, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1761 (1980).
11. See S. REP. No. 101-94 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723.
12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
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"[a]dequately compensate victims of oil spills, provide quick efficient
cleanup, minimize damage to fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources
and internalize those costs within the oil industry and its transportation
sector.'
13
OPA 90 is a complex statute which covers six different areas of marine
pollution mitigation, 4 as well as some specific cleanup goals for Prince
William Sound. 5 The statute is primarily concerned with the following
issues: 1) liability and compensation for damages; 2) fines for non-compli-
ance; 3) a cleanup fund; 4) improved vessel design; 5) improved communi-
cation and traffic monitoring; and 6) improved planning for cleanup
response.' 6 The area of improved vessel design contains the teeth of the
statute for owners of tankers and tank barges as it requires that all vessels
carrying oil or petroleum products must be built or retrofitted with double
hulls by January 1, 2015 or be retired from service. 7 It is this particular
section of OPA 90 that raises the specter of regulatory takings law for
owners of vessels affected by the statute.
B. A Brief Synopsis of Takings Law
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides, inter alia, that
private property will not be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion.'" The U.S. courts have struggled since 1922 with the interpretation of
these words and their application to laws that restrict an individual's use of
his property, typically in the form of land use regulations. 9 In 1922, Justice
Holmes first put forth the notion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon2" that if a
regulation was too restrictive its effect could amount to a compensable
taking." Since that opinion was written, both state and federal courts have
13. S. REP. No. 101-94 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723.
14. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
15. See id. §§ 2731-2737.
16. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
17. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703 (1994). For further discussion on the double hull require-
ment, see T. Alcock, Ecology, Tankers, and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A History of
Efforts to RequireDouble Hulls on Oil Tankers, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 97 (1992). Double hulls
have been studied since 1975. See id. at 108. Tankers that carry liquified natural gas and
other highly combustible materials were required to have double hulls before the enactment
of OPA 90. See id. at 110. Several studies have concluded that double hulls would have
been effective in reducing or even eliminating oil spillage resulting from groundings. See
id. at 108.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (defeating a
Pennsylvania statute that restricted coal mining activities from causing subsidence under a
private home).
20. Id.
21. See id. at413.
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tried to define where the line should be drawn between a noncompensable
exercise of police power and an unreasonable regulation.22
Several tests have been developed for takings law, starting with the
landmark Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 23 opinion
in 1978. The three factors that emerged from this decision to uphold a
landmark preservation law require a balance of economic impact, legislative
intent, and notice, which is specifically referred to as "distinct investment
backed expectations. ' '24 In 1987, the Supreme Court revisited the effect of
coal mining restrictions in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis Here the Court chose not to be bound by Pennsylvania
Coal and instead upheld a coal mining regulation based on public interest
and the inherent nature of police power to protect that interest.26 Since Penn
Central, the Supreme Court has also developed several other standards of
review including: 1) permanent physical occupation; 27 2) rational nexus
between exaction and purpose;28 and 3) a total diminution in value. 29 The
Supreme Court recently expressed a somewhat more conservative reaction
to ecological land regulation in Dolan v. City of Tigard, ° which effectively
22. See generally JESSE E. DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1123-1216
(4th ed. 1998).
23. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
24. Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
25. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
26. See id. at 488-93.
27. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding
that State mandated cable installations on private buildings constituted a permanent physical
occupation of property and reached the level of a taking requiring compensation).
28. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (finding a taking
has occurred where there is lack of nexus between the purpose and effect of land use
regulation).
29. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that
a regulation that denies all economic use of land constitutes a taking). In Lucas, the
Supreme Court found a compensable taking where a state statute, enacted two years after
a landowner paid close to $1 million for beachfront property, barred the construction of any
permanent structures. See id. at 1007, 1032. The Court called the nuisance-prevention pur-
pose of the statute with respect to beach erosion "unwarranted" and set a standard for takings
where a regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. See id. at
1015.
30. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). As a condition on a building
permit, the City of Tigard required Dolan to dedicate all land on site within the 100-year
flood plain to the city. See id. at 380. The city requested it be deeded over for public access
on a greenway along a river. The Supreme Court held that the condition failed the test of
rough proportions as a floodplain regulation. See id. at 395. Restricting development in the
floodplain could have been seen to advance a legitimate purpose of flood control, but the
creation of a public greenway and the deprivation of Dolan's right to exclude others was
outside the realm of the regulatory action and the Supreme Court likened it to a physical
permanent occupation of property. See id.
Maritrans, Inc. v. United States
increased the burden on the government to justify any development
mitigation regulations.
Two more remarkably conservative decisions on takings came from the
Federal Circuit in 1994. In Florida Rock Industries v. United States,3 the
court first announced that a wetlands regulation could violate the Just
Compensation Clause if it worked even a "partial taking" of property.32 In
Loveladies, Inc. Harbor v. United States,33 the same court affirmed a lower
court ruling that, for the purpose of takings analysis, only the parcel of
property affected by the wetlands regulation need be considered, not the
entire original parcel of land.34 In other words, Loveladies Harbor allows
a developer to subdivide and develop all the upland areas of land he owns
and then sue the government for the value of the remaining wetlands under
a partial takings doctrine.
As this brief history suggests, the line between regulatory taking and
reasonable regulation is constantly evolving. In Section III of this Note, yet
another standard of review gets added to the list-ripeness.
III. MAFITRANS, INC. V UNITED STATES
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1996, the largest U.S. tank barge 35 operator, Maritrans, Inc,36sued the
United States alleging that the effect of the OPA 90 on the forced retirement
of its single hull vessels rose to the level of a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.37 Maritrans purchased a fleet of thirty-seven single hull tank
31. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
32. Seeid. at 1570. Florida Rock involved the denial of a permit under the Clean
Water Act to mine limestone in an area of wetlands west of Miami. See id. at 1562. The
case followed abyzantine procedure, taking 14 years to conclude and prompting comparison
to Dickens' Bleak House. The Federal Circuit used a revolutionary approach to find that a
regulation that denies an owner of a substantial part of the economic use of his property
should be compensated under a partial taking doctrine. See Blumm, supra note 5, at 178.
33. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
34. See id. at 1181. Loveladies Harbor was decided three months after Florida Rock
by the same court. See id. at 1180. It allowed property owners to segment their property
into smallerparcels that could then be examined individually under theLucas "total takings"
rule. See Blumm, supra note 5, at 189. The court upheld an award of $2.6 million for 12.5
acres as compensation for restrictions imposed by a Corps of Engineers wetlands regulation.
See id. at 187.
35. See Coast Guard/Department ofTransportation Regulations, 46 C.F.R. § 30.10-65
(1998) (defining a tank barge as "[a] non-self-propelled tank vessel.").
36. Plaintiffs are Maritrans, Inc., Maritrans General Partner, Inc., Maritrans Operating
Partners, L.P., and Maritrans Capital Corp. See Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed Cl.
86 (1999).
37. See Joel Glass, USfaces single-hull compensation lawsuit, Lloyd's List Int'l, Aug.
24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11840254.
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barges 38 in 1987 and they now argue that the double hull requirement of
section 4115 of OPA 90 has significantly reduced the market value of these
vessels and forced them out of service before the end of their useful life.
39
Maritrans filed suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker
Act,4° seeking $200 million in compensation. The case was decided in two
separate trials4 (hereinafter Maritrans I and Maritrans 11) taking over one
year to decide the ultimate issue of whether or not OPA 90 effected a taking
of the Maritrans vessels. The first trial was conducted only to determine the
threshold issue of whether or not the plaintiffs had a property right as
proscribed by the Fifth Amendment.42 The second trial was held several
months later43 and followed the Supreme Court template for consideration
of regulatory takings laid out in the landmark Penn Central case."
1. Maritrans I
In Maritrans I,41 the defendant moved to dismiss, asserting that the
plaintiffs did not possess a property right in their vessels that fell within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment,46 and had therefore failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.47 This assertion was supported by a
number of cases representative of industries that were heavily regulated and
38. See id. As of the date of trial, Maritrans had sold or scrapped eleven of the vessels
because it considered the needed repairs and upgrades economically unsound under OPA
90. See Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 790, 791 (1998). The court did not
allow the retirement of the vessels to be part of its consideration of the regulatory taking
issue. See Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 86, 90 n.2 (1999).
39. See Glass, supra note 37.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The Tucker Act gives the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims (formerly the Court of Claims) jurisdiction over claims filed
against the government that are based on the Constitution, an act of Congress, or a
regulation. See id. A claim for just compensation based on a taking is founded in the fifth
amendment to the Constitution and is therefore well within the court's jurisdiction.
41. See Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 790 (1998) (Maritrans I) and
Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 86 (1999) (Maritrans II).
42. See Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. at 793.
43. The first Maritrans trial (Maritrans I) was decided on April 24, 1998. See id. at
790. The second Maritrans trial (Maritrans II) was decided on March 11, 1999. See
Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed.Cl. at 86 (1999).
44. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn
Central established three factors, now called the Penn Central factors, for analysis in
regulatory takings cases: 1) the character of the government action; 2) the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant; 3) the interference of the regulation with distinct
investment backed expectations. See id. at 124, 130.
45. Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 790. (1998)
46. Seeid.at791.
47. See id.
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were therefore found to possess no Fifth Amendment property interest.4"
The defense further argued that personal property has "[t]raditionally been
afforded less Fifth Amendment protection than real property."'49
The court denied the defendant's motion for dismissal in April of 1997
and the case proceeded to trial in April of 1998.50 The Maritrans I opinion
reflects the court's rejection of the defendant's argument, holding that a
"bright line heavy regulation test '" was inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent and that "[m]ere participation in a regulated industry does not
preclude a finding that a compensable taking has occurred."' 2 Having
decided that Maritrans did indeedpossess aFifth Amendmentproperty right
in its vessels,53 the court then proceeded to a second trial on the merits of a
takings claim.
2. Maritrans II
In Maritrans II, 4 the court followed the Supreme Court directive that
all takings cases shall be decided on an individual, ad-hoc, fact specific
basis.55 First, the court considered whether or not the plaintiff's investment
backed expectations could have reasonably anticipated the regulatory
requirements of OPA 90.56 Using a standard imported from the Federal
Circuit's decision in Loveladies Harbor,57 the court imposed a burden on
the plaintiffs to prove they had acquired the vessels "in reliance on a state
of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime." 8 The
plaintiffs met this burden and defeated the defense's argument that the
highly regulated nature of the shipping industry ran counter to any invest-
mentbacked expectations by introducing extensive expert testimony on the
48. See id. at 794-96. Cases cited include: MitchellArms, Inc. v. UnitedStates, 7 F.3d
212 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (upholding ATF suspension offirearms importpermits); Allied-General
Nuclear Services v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (upholding government
denial of plutonium plant operating permit); and Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to
Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a statutory provision restricting
the state of California's right to withdraw from the Social Security system).
49. Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. CL. at 797.
50. See id.
51. Id. at800-01.
52. Id. at 801.
53. See id. The only other decision of record involving a taking of non-real property
isAndrus v.Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) which held that a law prohibiting the sale of lawfully
acquired eagle parts did not effect a taking. See id. at 68.
54. Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 86 (1999).
55. See id. at 87 (referencing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 106 (1978)).
56. See id. at 87.
57. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
58. Id. at 1177.
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unforeseeability of OPA 90." The court agreed with the plaintiffs and
concluded that OPA 90 was only predictable in theory and did not meet the
standard of reasonably foreseeable.6
The court then proceeded to examine the character of the government
action. The defense relied on language from Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council6' in which the Supreme Court set a categorical takings
standard of all or nothing-only a total loss of property value was entitled
to compensation. 62 The court set aside this standard of review, opting
instead for a "partial regulatory taking analysis" as articulated by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 63 The opinion represents the
court's confusion in this area, however, as to the method of applying the
three Penn Central factors to a partial takings analysis.' The result of this
confusion was the court's failure to reach a definitive conclusion regarding
the government's intent in the passage of OPA 90.
The final stage of the court's examination covered the degree of
economic impact felt by the plaintiffs due to OPA 90.65 Here the court
encountered difficulty in establishing an appropriate time frame within
which to assess the adverse effects of the regulation. It was faced with two
choices: 1) the time at which the law was enacted; or 2) the time when the
law actually has an effect on the plaintiffs vessels, forcing either a retrofit
or retirement. Maritrans contended that the government "[s]evered the
economic stream associated with the vessels"' with the passage of OPA 90
and that the effect was "felt immediately.,
67
In the end, the court categorized the economic impact of OPA 90 on
Maritrans as a mere "diminution in value '68 which it then analogized to a
partial taking as recognized by the Federal Circuit.69 Following the Penn
59. See Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. at 88.
60. See id. at 89. But see Chang v. United States, 13 Ct. Cl. 555 (1987), in which the
Claims Court denied wage compensation to engineers in Libya whose employment contracts
had been voided by Executive Order. See id. at 556. The court held that the engineers could
have reasonably anticipated work interruptions due to increased tensions in U.S/Libyan
relations and that economic sanctions were foreseeable. See id. at 560.
61. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
62. Seeid.at 1019.
63. See Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 121 F.3d 727 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (unpublished table decision).
64. See Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. at 90.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at91.
69. See, e.g., Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 121 F. 3d 727 (1997);
Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In Florida Rock, the
Federal Circuit adopted the language of Professor Richard Epstein, the developer of the
partial takings doctrine. See id. at 1575.
Maritrans, Inc. v. United States
Central guidelines while implementing the partial takings methodology led
the court to define the ultimate issue: had the diminution in value been
offset by either the nature of the governmentaction or by strong investment
backed expectations?" The answer returned by the court was a simple "not
yet." The court went on to distinguish this case from the Supreme Court's
rejection of partial takings theory in Penn Central by stating:
"[h]ere, the only injury suffered by the plaintiffs so far is diminu-
tion in value, standing alone. If the law ever takes effect, it could
interfere with reasonable investment backed expectations and could
be held to merit compensation, but at this point the most the
plaintiffs could show at trial would be a reduction in the value of
the vessels, not the ability to use them. The character of the
government action cannot be challenged because the only action
the Government has undertaken so far is passing a law."'
Finally, after concluding that the Maritrans claim was untimely,72 the
court then refused to speculate on the viability of a Maritrans claim in the
future. While justifying this decision with a plea ofjudicial economy,73 the
court still expressed some discomfort with the fine line it had just drawn.
It left it up to future triers of fact to further define the difference between
"economic value" and "economically viable use" in takings law.74
IV. DISCUSSION
The Court of Federal Claims was too quick to conclude that the
Maritrans takings claim was simply untimely. By failing to adequately
assess the character of the government action in the passage of OPA 90, the
court has left the door ajar for future takings claims to arise under the
statute.75 The court reasons that the diminution-in-value test can be applied
across the board as matter of efficiency, but the test has a number of
70. See Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed Cl. at 91.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 92.
73. See id. at 91. The court here seems to embrace the judicial activism at work in the
LoveladiesHarboropinion. TheLoveladiesHarborcourt allowed segmentation ofproperty
for takings actions-only those parcels affected would be considered, not the undertaking
as a whole. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d at 1181. The Maritrans
H court states: "We see no reason to hold a trial on the economic impact of the regulation
at issue with respect to nearly 40 vessels when none of the vessels has been retired."
Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. at 91.
74. Seeid. at91.
75. See id. The court said specifically that "[o]nce OPA 90 has retired certain vessels
in the Maritrans fleet, compensation might be due. [T]he loss is not the result of a taking,
which admittedly may yet occur." Id.
2000]
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shortcomings.76 For instance, how extreme does the economic impact have
to be in order for OPA 90 to become a regulation that has gone too far? If
OPA 90 is found to protect the general public welfare, shouldn't the court
have upheld it as a legitimate use of police power? The failure of the court
to address these issues stems from its adherence to the partial takings
analysis, the brainchild of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The partial takings doctrine essentially removes any consideration ofpublic
benefit from the equation, thereby limiting the court's discussion to the
degree of economic impact versus the investment backed expectations.
Rather than being hamstrung by the Federal Circuit's method, the Maritrans
court might have reached the same holding but provided stronger guidance
if it had followed the template provided by the Supreme Court in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis.77
A. Using Keystone as a Template
In Keystone, the Court began its analysis by quoting Justice Holmes's
directive on takings law and police power from Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon.78 Had the Maritrans court followed this example, the first ques-
tions addressed might have been: 1) Is this regulation a valid exercise of
police power even though it causes someone to be less well off than he was
before the regulation?;79 and 2) Does the law simply restrain conduct which
76. Use of the diminution-in-value test under a partial takings analysis is shortsighted.
The court considers only the following factors: value of property before enactment of
regulation = X, value ofproperty following enactment of regulation = Y; ifX-Y = too severe
of an impact, then the regulation is a taking. This limited focus does not take into account
that OPA 90 served twenty-five years of notice before its effect will be felt. It also fails to
consider that most of the Maritrans vessels will be close to end of their useful lives by the
year 2015 and that single hulled boats can remain in service after 2015 in any non-petroleum
shipping capacity, such as grain or cement. Under the court's strict formula, any regulation
that prescribes a phasing out period of a particular property use is a prime suspect for a
takings claim.
77. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
78 See id. The Court stated that:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the
contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not all cases, there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation
to sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts.
Id. at 473 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
79. See generally, Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
This question also find support with other commentators. "[T]he use of compensation
Maritrans, Inc. v. United States
is harmful to others or does it aim to extract public enrichment from private
property? 0
The character of the government action in Keystone was remarkably
similar to the intentions of OPA 90. Both are aimed at a particular industry
and effect an impairment of a use of property for the protection of public
interests."' Perhaps theprotection of marine resources and shoreline habitat
from the hazards of oil spill pollution is an even stronger and more global
argument than the locally focused Subsidence Act upheld in Keystone.
Nothing in OPA 90 suggests that it is a statute enacted solely for the benefit
of a private party.
Another factual comparison to Keystone that is followed by Maritrans
is the burden borne by the plaintiffs to prove a denial of "economically
viable use." 2 Just as the Keystone plaintiffs failed to prove that the
continuation of coal mining was all but impossible, Maritrans likewise
failed to prove that the domestic shipping ofoil and petroleum products had
become commercially impracticable. This failure led the court to categorize
the Maritrans loss as a mere diminution in value, not a denial of economic
use.
8 3
V. CONCLUSION
In Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, the plaintiffs claim that the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 effected a taking of their vessels was found to be
premature because it was not presented in a specific factual time frame. By
following the formula for takings analysis set by the Supreme Court in Penn
Central, overlaid on the Federal Circuit partial taking doctrine, the court
was faced with the impossible task of ruling on what could only be called
a speculative test of rough proportions. The end result of this confusion
was a dismissal for being untimely. Perhaps if the court had followed a
different script for regulatory takings analysis, it might have reached a
similar conclusion but left larger signposts along the way. The process
followed by the Supreme Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, which was initiated with a complete study of the legislative
intent, might have provided a more appropriate script for the Maritrans
court to follow. Had the court used Keystone as a template, it might have
cannot arise until the question ofjustification has been disposed of." RICHARD A. EPsTEIN,
TAKINGs: PRIvATE PROPERTY AND THE ROLE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 199 (1985).
80. See Michelman, supra note 79, at 1196. A similar sentiment was echoed in the
dissent in the Pennsylvania Coal decision. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at
416 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
81. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 485.
82. See id. at 493-96.
83. See Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. at 91.
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reached the same conclusion that the takings claim was premature, but it
might also have concluded that OPA 90 advanced a legitimate state interest
and that the benefit to the general public from oil spill pollution prevention
far outweighed the burden felt by the oil and gas industry.
